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In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of firms introducing 
anti-takeover provisions in Japan as well. In this paper, we analyze the characteristics 
of Japanese firms that introduced anti-takeover provisions during the four year period 
from fiscal 2005 to fiscal 2008, following the release of the official guidelines for 
anti-takeover provisions in 2005. Our main results are the following. First, firms' 
operating performance or stock market valuations were not related to the adoption of 
takeover defense measures. Second, firms' age and their ownership structure were 
correlated with the adoption of antitakeover provisions. Specifically, companies that 
were older, had lower proportions of shares held by their directors, or higher 
cross-shareholding ratios were more likely to adopt takeover defense measures, which 
suggests that the adoption of such measures is motivated by self-protection on the part 
of corporate managers and influenced by the conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders. In addition, as controlling shareholders had lower shares of stocks and 
institutional investors had higher shares of stocks, firms were more inclined to adopt 
takeover defense measures, suggesting that companies are likely to adopt such 
measures if their shares are liquid and easy to acquire. 
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Managerial Entrenchment and Antitakeover Provisions in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
     Why do some firms adopt takeover defense measures and why do others not? 
Motivations for adopting antitakeover provisions have attracted many researchers 
interested in corporate governance as well as policymakers. If firms are more likely 
to adopt antitakeover provisions when their performance deteriorates or when 
managers behave themselves for their own interests, then antitakeover provisions 
prevent the takeover that would discipline managers and increase firm values 
without them (e.g., Manne, 1965). On the other hand, if firms tend to adopt 
antitakeover provisions when they are in the danger of the takeover that breaches 
trust among the stakeholders including managers and workers, then antitakeover 
provisions protect firms from the value-destroying takeover (e.g., Shleifer and 
Summers, 1988).   
     We examine whether managers adopt antitakeover provisions for the purpose 
of managerial entrenchment, that is, to prevent themselves from losing their 
positions after takeovers. To this aim, Japanese experience servers as a 
quasi-natural experiment. In May 2005, the Japanese government released the 
guideline of antitakeover provisions, which endorsed Delaware takeover 
jurisprudence developed in the 1980s in the U.S. Since then, many firms adopted 
poison pills, though no firms had adopted antitakeover provisions before then. We 
consider the sudden emergence of antitakeover provisions in Japan as a good 
opportunity to study the relationship between ex ante firm characteristics and the 
decision whether or not to adopt antitakeover provisions. Without such an 
opportunity it would be difficult to distinguish the causal relationships between 
whether firm performance affects the decision of adopting antitakeover provisions 
or the adoption of antitakeover provisions affects firm performance. Distinguishing 
the causal relationship between the two is one of the most important contributions 
we make to the literature of antitakeover provisions. 
      Using Japanese firm data over the period of 2005-2008, we investigate the 
relationship between ex-ante firm characteristics and the decision of adopting 
antitakeover provisions. Though some preceding studies apply event study 
methodologies to the U.S. firms to investigate how stock price responds to the 
announcement of adopting antitakeover provisions, event studies are difficult to 
apply to Japanese firms because Japanese firms often release many pieces of 
information besides antitakeover provisions at the same time.   3 
 
     Most of the preceding studies focused on firms in the U.S. (Malatesta and 
Walking, 1988; Mallette and Fower, 1992; Strong and Meyer, 1990; Davis, 1991; 
Davis and Stout, 1991; Sundaramurthy, 1996; Davis and Greve, 1997; Danielason 
and Karpoff, 1998). However, the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions including 
hostile takeovers is spreading over most industrial countries and emerging markets, 
though it was temporarily interrupted by the recent credit crisis. It would be 
interesting to analyze the motives of adopting antitakeover provisions for firms in a 
country where corporate laws and governance are different from the U.S. 
The rest of the paper is composed of four sections. In Section 2, we briefly 
describe the overview of hostile takeovers and antitakeover provisions in Japan. In 
Section 3, we present some hypotheses on the motives of adopting antitakeover 
provisions based on preceding studies. In Section4, we describe our dataset and 
estimation methodology. In Section 5, we present our estimation results. Section 5 
concludes with some policy implications. 
      
2. Overview of hostile takeovers and antitakeover provisions in Japan 
In Japan, hostile takeovers were almost nonexistent until the early 2000s. 
Though there were some hostile bids by domestic and foreign investors at the end of 
the 1980s (“the bubble period”), they were unsuccessful. Traditionally, 
cross-shareholdings within a business group prevented hostile takeovers. As 
cross-shareholdings were gradually dissolved in the 1990s when stock prices 
stagnated and mark-to-market accounting was partially introduced, hostile 
takeover bids gradually increased. However, hostile raiders were still 
foreign-affiliated funds at the beginning of the 2000s. Since then, however, some 
domestic firms began to try hostile takeover bids against domestic firms. Faced with 
the real threat of hostile takeovers by domestic firms, Japanese firms sought for 
defensive measures.                       
In May 2005, the Japanese government released the guideline of 
antitakeover provisions, which endorsed Delaware takeover jurisprudence 
developed in the 1980s in the U.S.１  Since then, many firms adopted antitakeover 
provisions of poison pills. Table 1 shows that the number of firms that adopted 
antitakeover provisions were none in fiscal year 2004, 47 in fiscal year 2005 and 132 
in fiscal year 2008２. The proportion of firms that had adopted antitakeover 
provisions among those listed at Tokyo Exchange reached about one-seventh at the 
end of 2008. Among various antitakeover provisions, the prior warning type is very 
popular. They have a rule that must be followed by bidders pursuing takeovers, and 4 
 
the breach of it leads to the implementation of defense measures such as the 
issuance of new stock reservation rights. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
  What are the motives of adopting antitakeover provisions? This paper examines 
whether managers adopt them for the purpose of managerial entrenchment, that is, 
to protect themselves from the threat of losing their positions through takeovers. 
We classify the purpose of entrenchment into two categories. One is various 
measures of firm performance that are likely to depend on managers’ efforts or 
quality. The other is firm characteristics that facilitate managerial entrenchment. 
In addition to these two entrenchment motives, we consider the probability of being 
a target of a takeover that is beyond managers’ control at least in the short run. 
 
A. Poor performance 
Hostile takeovers can work as a disciplinary device on management by 
changing managers of poorly performing firms and thereby improving efficiency and 
shareholder values. In this case, poorly-performing firms are likely to be a target of 
a takeover because acquirers can improve firm performance to a great extent by 
changing managers (Manne, 1965). As firm performance is worse in terms of 
operating performance or stock market valuation, managers are more likely to 
adopt antitakeover provisions for the purpose of entrenchment. In addition, firms 
that have abundant liquid assets may do so because they are not required to return 
them to stockholders even though they cannot find growth opportunities. Hence 
firms with abundant liquid assets tend to spend them on inefficient projects for the 
sake of managers’ private benefits (Jensen, 1986). Such firms are likely to be a 
target of hostile takeovers and consequently to adopt antitakeover provisions.   
We can summarize the relationship between firm performance and the adoption 
of antitakeover provisions as the following three hypotheses with some relevant 
empirical evidences. 
 
Hypothesis A1. Poor operating performance. 
    If a firm’s operating performance is poorer, the firm is more likely to adopt 
antitakeover provisions. 
 
    Malatesta and Walking (1988) showed that those firms that adopted poison 
pills had seen significantly lower profitability in a previous year than those that did 5 
 
not adopt them in the middle of the 1980s in the U.S. On the other hand, Mallette 
and Fower (1992) found no significant relationship between ROE and the adoption 
of poison pills in 1988 in the U.S. 
 
Hypothesis A2. Poor stock market performance. 
    If stock market valuation is lower, the firm is more likely to adopt antitakeover 
provisions. 
 
   Strong and Meyer (1990) examined the U.S. firms and found that those firms 
that adopted poison pills saw lower price-to-earnings ratio (PER). Davis and Stout 
(1991) also found that those firms with lower market-to-book ratios are more likely 
to be a target of a takeover. On the other hand, Davis (1991), Sundaramurthy (1996), 
and Davis and Greve (1997) found that the market-to-book ratio is not significantly 
related to the adoption of poison pills. 
 
Hypothesis A3. Liquidity. 
Firms with more liquid assets are more likely to adopt antitakeover 
provisions.   
 
    Using the sample of Japanese firms, Xu (2008) finds that firms with high liquid 




    Several firm characteristics represent how solid managers entrench themselves 
from outside shareholders: firm age, CEO’s tenure, board composition, managerial 
stock ownership, and cross-shareholding, among others. 
 
B1. Firm Age 
     Old firms tend to have inflexible organization and face difficulty in adapting 
themselves to the changes in environment. Furthermore, they tend to oppose to a 
drastic change of management and adopt antitakeover provisions to protect the 
status-quo. 
 
Hypothesis B1. Firm age. 
    Old firms are more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions. 6 
 
 
    Davis and Stout (1992) show that in the U.S., older firms were more likely to be 
a target of takeovers. 
 
B2. CEO’s tenure 
     As a CEO holds her position for a longer time, she can exert a stronger 
influence on the board including the appointment of directors and thus can 
entrench herself from outsiders. She is likely to adopt poison pills to further 
strengthen their grips on her firm. 
 
Hypothesis B2. CEO’s tenure 
    Firms with a longer CEO’s tenure are more likely to adopt antitakeover 
provisions. 
 
    Malette and Fowler (1992) studies companies included in the Standard and 
Poors 500 index and finds that the correlation between CEO’s tenure and the 
likelihood of the adoption of poison pills was positive, though not statistically 
significant. 
 
B3. Board composition 
    Outside directors are more likely to be objective and independent of 
management than insiders (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Outside directors 
are expected to monitor managers for the sake of shareholders. Hence firms with a 
board composed of a large share of insiders tend to adopt antitakeover provisions 
because such a board is likely to agree with the current managers (Davis, 1991; 
Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 1996; Danielason and Karpoff, 1998). 
 
Hypothesis B3. Board composition. 
     Firms with a board composed of a larger share of insiders and a smaller share 
of independent outsiders are more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions. 
 
Empirical evidences for the U.S. firms are mixed. Mallette and Fowler (1992) 
and Sundaramurthy (1996) find that the share of outside directors and the 
likelihood of adopting poison pills was positive, though not significant, for the U.S. 
firms. On the other hand, Danielason and Karpoff (1998) find that the less the 
proportion of inside directors is, the more likely the firm is to adopt poison pills. 7 
 
They find that this relationship is significant. Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve 
(1997) find similar results to Danielason and Karpoff (1998), though not significant. 
 
B4. Managerial stock ownership and cross-shareholdings 
     Ownership has a great impact on to what extent managers’ interests are 
aligned to those of stockholders. A larger share of managerial stock ownership 
suggests a greater degree of alignment between the two. A lower share of 
managerial ownership may result in the conflicts of interests and managerial 
entrenchment, and hence the adoption of antitakeover provisions (Malatesta and 
Walking, 1988; Davis, 1991; Mallete and Fowler, 1992). On the other hand, a larger 
share of managerial ownership can empower managers and result in entrenchment 
(Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 1983). These two opposing arguments 
concerning managerial ownership may be settled by non-linear effects on the degree 
of firm value. Morck et al. (1988) finds an inverse U-curve relationship between 
managerial ownership and the firm value. However, since it is often difficult to 
detect a nonlinear relationship, we simply present two opposing hypotheses 
concerning the effects of managerial ownership on the adoption of antitakeover 
provisions. 
In addition to managerial ownership, cross-shareholdings in a business group 
have been used as a takeover defense measure in Japan since capital accounts were 
liberalized in 1964. A high share of cross-shareholdings suggests that managerial 
entrenchment is solid and can result in a high likelihood of adopting antitakeover 
provisions.   
 
Hypothesis B4. Managerial ownership as the alignment of manager/shareholder 
interests. 
    Firms with a lower share of managerial ownership is more likely to adopt 
antitakeover provisions. 
 
Hypothseis B5. Managerial ownership as entrenchment. 
    Firms with a higher share of managerial ownership is more likely to adopt 
antitakeover provisions. 
 
Hypothesis B6. Cross-shareholding 
    Firms with a higher share of cross-shareholding is more likely to adopt 
antitakeover provisions. 8 
 
 
   Many empirical studies for the U.S. firms find that a low share of managerial 
ownership results in a high likelihood of adopting poison pills (Malatesta and Walking, 
1988; Strong and Meyer, 1990; Davis, 1991; Mallete and Fowler, 1992; Davis and Greve, 1997; 
Danielson and Karpoff, 1998). On the other hand, Sundaramurthy (1996) finds a U-curve 
relationship between the share of managerial ownership and the likelihood of adopting poison 
pills. 
 
C. Other factors affecting the probability of being a target of a hostile takeover   
   Some other factors affect the probability that a firm becomes a target of a hostile takeover 
though they are beyond managers’ control at least in the short-run, and hence the likelihood of 
adopting antitakeover provisions either for managerial entrenchment or prevention from the 
breach of trust. We consider firm size, stock liquidity and ownership, leverage, and adoption of 
antitakeover provisions by rivals, among others. 
 
C1. Firm size 
     Acquirers, when financially constrained, can acquire a firm more easily when the target 
firm has a small size in terms of market value (Davis and Schwert, 1995; Davis and Greve, 
1997). To protect themselves, small firms tend to adopt antitakeover provisions. 
 
Hypothesis C1. Firm size 
     Firms with a smaller market value are more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions. 
 
    Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve (1997) finds that among the U.S. firms, firms with 
smaller market values were more likely to adopt poison pills. Comment and Schwert (1995), on 
the other hand, find that firms with a larger asset size tended to adopt poison pills in the U.S. 
 
C2. Stock liquidity and ownership 
     If stocks are held more by foreigners, individuals or other dispersed investors 
and less by stable stockholders including business partners and financial 
institutions, stocks become more liquid and hence hostile takeovers are more likely 
to be successful (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998). Xu (2007) finds that in Japan, as the 
share of dominant stable shareholders is low, the firm is more likely to be a target of 
hostile takeovers. 
     As for the share of institutional stockholders, two competing effects are 
possible. If institutional investors including foreign investors have a short horizon 9 
 
and easily sell their shares in response to tender offers, firms whose shares are held 
by institutional investors are likely to adopt antitakeover provisions (Mallette and 
Fowler, 1992; Davis and Stout, 1992). On the other hand, if institutional investors 
behave themselves in the interests of general stockholders, a large share of 




a) Dominant shareholders 
A low share of ownership by dominant shareholders and a high share of small 
shareholders result in a high likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions. 
 
b) Institutional shareholders (with short time horizons) 
    A high share of ownership by institutional shareholders results in a high 
likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions. 
 
c) Institutional shareholders (as a monitor) 
    A high share of institutional shareholders results in a low likelihood of adopting 
takeover provisions. 
 
     Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve (1997) finds that in the U.S., a low level of 
concentration in ownership results in a high likelihood of adopting poison pills. As 
for the effects of institutional investors, many researchers find a positive correlation 
between the share of institutional shareholders and the likelihood of adopting 
poison pills for U.S. firms (Strong and Meyer, 1990; Davis, 1991; Mallette and 
Fowler, 1992; Davis and Greve, 1997; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998), though 
Sundaramurthy (1996) finds no significant correlation between them. 
 
C3. Leverage 
    Hostile takeovers are often done for the purpose of redistribute free cash flow to 
stockholders by raising leverage (Jensen, 1989). Low-levered firms are more likely 
to be a target and hence to adopt antitakeover provisions. 
 




     Davisn and Stout (1992) find that in the U.S., firms with low debt-to-asset 
ratio were more likely to be a target. Xu (2007) finds a similar tendency for 
Japanese firms. 
 
C4. Adoption of antitakeover provisions by rival firms 
     As more firms in the same industry adopt antitakeover provisions, firms 
without antitakeover provisions are more likely to be a target (Davis, 1991). In 
addition, the adoption of antitakeover provisions may not result in a deterioration of 
stock market if more firms have already adopted them and this may mitigate a 
CEO’s hesitation for it. 
 
Hypothesis C4. A high proportion of firms in the industry that have adopted 
antitakeover provisions results in a high likelihood of adopting antitakeover 
provisions. 
 
     Davis (1991) finds no significant correlation between the proportion of firms in 
the same industry that adopted antitakeover provisions and the likelihood of each 
firm adopting them for U.S. firms. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
    Our data source for financial statements and measures of corporate governance 
is NEEDS-Corporate Governance Evaluation System, abbreviated as 
NEEDS-CGES, published by Nikkei Digital Media. NEEDS-CGES is a dataset 
containing various measures of corporate governance, including ownership 
structure and board members. 
   Sample firms are firms listed on stock exchanges in Japan３  except for those 
firms that are determined to be delisted, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), 
Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs), preferred stocks, Bank of Japan, firms listed in the 
foreign country section of Tokyo Stock Exchange and Venture Funds listed in Osaka 
Stock Exchange. The number of sample firms are 3761, 3809, 3937 and 3883 as of 
March 2005, March 2006, March 2007 and March 2008, respectively.  
We use the financial statements of the accounting years just before the decision 
of adopting antitakeover provisions. Most Japanese firms adopt the accounting year 
beginning in April and ending in March. Therefore, when we examine the decision 
of adopting antitakeover provisions during the period from April 2005 to March 
2006, we use the financial statements ending in March 2005. If firms adopt the 11 
 
accounting year otherwise, we use the financial statements ending before the 
decision of adopting antitakeover provisions.   
Data source on the adoption of antitakeover provisions is a member service by 
Commercial Law Center Inc. (CLC, or Shoji Homu Kenkyu Kai in Japanese) and 
firms’ press releases. Data from CLC includes the names of the firms that adopted 
antitakeover provisions, the dates of their adoptions, and the contents of the 
provisions. Another possible data source of antitakeover provisions is Monthly 
MARR published by RECOF. We confirmed that our sample is more comprehensive 
than Monthly MARR in that all of the firms contained by Monthly MARR that 
adopted antitakeover provisions were included in our sample firms. 
    We estimate the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions using the 
following Probit model for each accounting year, in which the dependent variable, 
Poison, takes the value of unity if the firm adopted antitakeover provisions and zero 
otherwise. 







* .  
1  i Poison     0
* i Poison  
0  i Poison     0
* i Poison  
The dependent variable, Poison*, is a latent variable that affects the decision of 
firm i’s adopting antitakeover provisions. Three vectors of explanatory variables, A, 
B and C represent relevant measures of the hypotheses described in the previous 
section. Const. is a constant and   s are coefficient vectors on each vector of 
explanatory variables.  e  is a random error. We describe the dependent variables. 
See Appendix for the details of the variables.   
The first explanatory variables represent measures of firm performance: 
returns on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, price-to-book ratio (PBR), and liquid asset ratio. 
Hypotheses A1 thorough A3 suggest that ROA, Tobin’s Q, and PBR take negative 
coefficients and liquid asset ratio takes a positive coefficient. 
The second explanatory variables represent measures of managerial 
entrenchment: firm age, CEO’s tenure, the proportion of outside directors, the share 
of managerial ownership, and the share of cross-holdings. Hypotheses B1 through 
B6 suggest that the firm age, CEO’s tenure, and the share of cross-holdings take 
positive coefficients, while the share of outside directors take negative coefficients. 
The share of managerial ownership takes either positive or negative coefficient. 
The third explanatory variables are control variables that affect the likelihood 
of being a target of hostile takeovers: the logarithm of market-valued equity, the 12 
 
share of ownership by dominant shareholders, the share of ownership by 
institutional investors, the share of minority shareholders, the debt-to-asset ratio, 
and the proportion of firms that adopted antitakeover provisions in the industry of 
the firm. Hypotheses C1 through C4 suggest that the logarithm of market-valued 
equity, the share of dominant shareholders, and the debt-to-asset ratio take 
negative coefficients while the share of institutional investors, the share of minority 
shareholders, and the proportion of the firms that adopted antitakeover provisions 
in the industry take positive coefficients. 
Table 2 summarizes descriptive sample statistics of the above variables. Table 2 
also reports the test statistics of whether the means and medians are different 
between those firms that adopted antitakeover provisions and those that did not４. 
  Several features are evident from Table 2. First,   the differences in 
performance measures are not clear. For example, though the means of Tobin’s Q 
are lower for firms adopting antitakeover provisions than those not adopting them 
in some years, the medians of ROA and Tobin’s Q are opposites. Second, firm age 
and the share of cross-shareholdings are significantly higher and the share of 
outside directors and the share of managerial ownership are significantly lower for 
firms adopting antitakeover provisions than those not adopting them either in 
terms of means or medians, which are consistent with Hypotheses B1, B6, B3 and 
B4, respectively. Third, among the control variables, the share of ownership by 
dominant shareholders and the debt-to-asset ratio are significantly lower and the 
share of ownership by institutional investors is significantly higher for firms 
adopting antitakeover provisions than for firms not adopting them, which are 
consistent with C2a, C3 and C2b, respectively, though the significance levels of the 
debt-to-asset ratio vary depending on years. In addition, the proportion of firms that 
adopted antitakeover provisions in the industry is higher for firms adopting 
antitakeover provisions, consistent with Hypothesis C4.   
 
5. Baseline results 
    Table 3 shows the baseline year-by-year estimation results. The first and 
second rows show the coefficient and the marginal effects at the mean value of each 
explanatory variable. Because ROA, Tobin’s Q, and PBR are highly correlated with 
one another, we include these variables one by one.   
 
A. Performance   
   Among the performance measures, we find that none of ROA, Tobin’s Q or PBR 13 
 
is significant for any year, not supporting Hypothesis A1 or A2５. Looking at the 
results for year 2005, we find that the liquid asset ratio is significantly positive, 
consistent with Hypothesis A3. However, the significance of the liquid asset ratio 
disappears for years 2006 and later.  
 
B. Entrenchment 
    Table 3 suggests that firms with high degree of managerial entrenchment tend 
to adopt antitakeover provisions. 
First, firm age takes positive and marginally significant coefficients in one 
specification (with ROA as a performance measure) for years 2006 and 2008, 
consistent with Hypothesis B1. 
Second, the share of managerial ownership takes negative and significant 
coefficients for years 2006 and 2007, and a marginally significant coefficient for year 
2008, suggesting that managerial ownership serves as alignment of interests 
between stockholders and managers (Hypothesis B4).  
Third, the share of cross-shareholdings takes positive and significant 
coefficients for years 2006, 2007 and 2008. Though firms with a high share of 
cross-shareholdings are unlikely to be a target of hostile takeovers (Xu, 2006), they 
tend to adopt antitakeover provisions. This result strongly suggests a strong motive 
for managerial entrenchment (Hypothesis B6). 
On the other hand, CEO’s tenure and the share of outside directors do not take 
significant coefficients. The Guideline strongly suggests that the judgment by 
outside directors be valued in deciding the adoption of antitakeover provisions as an 
example of ensuring their necessity and validity. The Guideline may have an effect 
that firms with a higher share of outside directors may easily adopt antitakeover 
provisions. One may suspect that firms may have increased the number of outside 
directors to adopt antitakeover provisions in accordance with the Guideline after it 
was released. If this is the case, the estimated coefficient is biased upwards. To deal 
with this possible endogeneity, we later use as an instrumental variable the share of 
outside directors as of 2004, before the Guideline was released, to estimate the 
likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions in years 2006 and later. 
 
C. Control variables 
     First, the logarithm of market value takes positive and significant coefficients, 
which contradicts with Hypothesis C1. A small firm may find it difficult or costly to 
adopt antitakeover provisions. Comment and Schwert (1995) also finds a positive 14 
 
correlation between firm size and the likelihood of adopting poison pills for US firms, 
insisting that adopting poison pills requires a fixed cost including attorneys’ fees 
and hence exhibits a scale economy. 
     Second, the share of ownership by dominant shareholders takes negative and 
significant coefficients for all years, consistent with Hypothesis C2a. The share of 
ownership by institutional shareholders takes positive and significant coefficients 
for year 2006, suggesting that institutional investors have short time horizons 
(Hypothesis C2b) rather than work as effective monitors, though this result holds 
only for one year. 
    Third, the debt-to-asset ratio takes negative and significant coefficients for year 
2006, consistent with Hypothesis C3.   
    Finally, the proportion of firms adopting antitakeover provisions in the industry 
of the firm takes positive and significant coefficients for years 2007 and 2008, 
consistent with Hypothesis C4. 
 
5. Robustness 
    In this section, we check the robustness of the baseline results above by 
changing specifications. To save space we show results only for ROA as a 
performance measure, but most of the results do not change when we use Tobin’s Q 
or PBR６.   
   
5.1 Endogeneity of the share of outside directors 
       After the Guideline was published in 2005, the firms that wanted to adopt 
antitakeover provisions may have increased the share of outside directors to comply 
with the Guideline before they actually adopted them. To deal with such potential 
endogeneity, we estimate the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions in years 
2006 and later by conducting instrumental variable probit estimation using as 
instruments the share of outside directors as of year 2004. Table 4 shows the 
estimation results. Wald test of exogeneity shows that the error terms in the 
structural equation (probit) and the reduced-form equation for the endogenous 
variable (i.e., the share of outside directors) are not significantly correlated, 
suggesting that the endogeneity bias in the baseline estimation is not significant. 
The coefficients on the share of outside directors are insignificant as in the baseline 
results.   
 
5.2 Free cash flow hypothesis 15 
 
     Free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) posits that firms with more liquid 
assets but with less growth opportunities tend to be a target of hostile takeovers. Xu 
(2007) lends support to this hypothesis using Japanese firm data. Those firms may 
be more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions. To test this hypothesis, we use a 
dummy variable that takes unity if Tobin’s Q is below its median for each year 
(1.075, 1,203, 1.204, and 1.105 in years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively) 
and zero otherwise and use as an explanatory variable the intersection of this 
dummy and the liquid asset ratio. To save space, we omit the table of this result７, 
but this intersection term does not take significant coefficients in any year. 
 
5.3  Firm value protection hypothesis 
     Firms may adopt antitakeover provisions in order to protect the firm value 
from the hostile takeovers that destroy the firm value either by breaching the 
long-run implicit contract between managers and workers or by redirecting the firm 
operation towards maximizing short-run cash flow. To explore this hypothesis, we 
take two alternative specifications. 
First, according to the breach of trust hypothesis, firms are more likely to 
adopt antitakeover provisions when their operating performances temporarily 
worsen. This will cause a downward bias to the operating performance measures. 
We deal with this potential bias by using operating performance measures averaged 
over three-year up to the previous year. Though we omit the table８, most of the 
coefficients are similar to the baseline results except for the firm age, which turns to 
be insignificant. 
     Next, we see whether firms tend to adopt antitakeover provisions as they are 
rich in long-run investment opportunities. As a measure of long-run investment, we 
use research and development expenditures as a proportion of sales, referred to as 
R&D intensity hereafter. Firms may adopt antitakeover provisions in order to 
protect from curtailing R&D intensity from the short-run viewpoint or from 
transferring intelligent assets to other firms via scorched earth strategies. The data 
source of R&D intensity is a database published by Development Bank of Japan. 
The sample size is slightly smaller than the size in the baseline estimation (2784, 
3037, 2727, and 2607 in years 2005-2008, resepectively). Table 5 shows the results. 
The coefficients on R&D intensities are negative and insignificant, not supporting 
the short-termism hypothesis. Most of the other variables are similar to the 
baseline estimation results. We also use R&D expenditures as a proportion of total 
assets and obtain insignificant coefficients on them. 16 
 
 
E. Panel Estimation 
     As a final robustness check, we pool the data from year 2005 through year 
2008 and apply a panel data estimation method. If a firm’s decision of adopting 
antitakeover provisions is hit by idiosyncratic shocks that do not change over time, 
a random-effect probit model is an appropriate model. The dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes unity if the firm adopted antitakeover provisions in the year or 
before and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are lagged one year as in the 
baseline model. The proportion of firms adopting antitakeover provisions in the 
industry of the firm is excluded from the explanatory variables because its value as 
of year 2005 is not available. We add year dummies to the explanatory variables. 
     Table 6 shows the estimation results. The specification test favors the 
random-effect probit model against the pooled probit model. The results are quite 
similar to the baseline results. The performance measures are not significant. 
Among the entrenchment measures, firm age, the share of managerial ownership, 
and the share of cross-shareholdings are significant with expected signs. Among the 
control variables, the logarithm of market value, the share of dominant 
shareholders, and the debt-to-asset ratio are significant with the same signs as in 
the benchmark year-by-year estimation results.   
 
6. Conclusions   
     We tested the managerial entrenchment hypothesis on the motive of adopting 
antitakeover provision using Japanese firm data over the period of April 2005 
through March 2009. Specifically, we tested whether the firm’s operating 
performance measures and the entrenchment measures are related to the likelihood 
of adopting antitakeover provisions. Our results can be summarized as follows. 
A. Firm performance measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q and PBR is not correlated with 
the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions. 
B. Managerial entrenchment measured by the old firm age, the low share of 
managerial ownership and the high share of cross-shareholdings are significantly 
correlated with the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions. 
C. Market liquidity, measured by the low share of ownership by dominant 
shareholders and the high share of ownership by institutional investors, is 
significantly correlated with the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions. The 
liquid asset ratio, the debt-to-asset ratio, and the proportion of firms adopting 
antitakeover provisions in the industry are also significantly correlated with the 17 
 
likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions. 
 
    In sum, though firms do not tend to adopt antitakeover provisions in response 
to worsening operating performance, they are more likely to do so when managerial 
entrenchment is more solid. The positive correlation between the share of 
cross-shareholdings and the likelihood of adopting antitakeover provisions, in 
particular, strongly suggests the entrenchment motive, because firms with a higher 
share of cross-shareholdings are less likely to be a target of hostile takeover and yet 
more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions.     
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Appendix. Variables 
A. Measures of performance. 
ROA: current profits as a proportion of total assets as of the previous accounting 
year. 
Tobin’s Q: the sum of market-valued stocks and book-valued debt as a proportion of 
total assets including unrealized profits (or losses) of subsidiaries and affiliates. 
PBR: market-valued stocks as a proportion of book-valued shareholders’ equity. 
Liquid asset ratio: the sum of cash and deposits, securities and securities for 
investment as a proportion of total assets. We delete those firms with negative 
liquid assets from the sample. 
 
B. Measures of entrenchment. 
Firm age: the difference between the current year and the year when the firm was 
established. The latter is available in Quarterly Company Report (“Kaisha Shiki 
Ho”) published by Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha. 
CEO’s tenure: the differenc between the current year and the year when the current 
CEO took her position.   
Share of outside directors: the number of outside directors as a proportion of total 
number of directors. 
Share of managerial ownership: Share of stocks held by managers . Firms with 
more than 100 percent is estimated to be held by mangers are excluded from the 
sample. 
Share of cross-holdings: Share of stocks held by listed companies whose shares are 
held by the firm, estimated by Nissei Life Insurance (NLI) Research Institute.   
 
C. Control variables. 
Logarithm of market-valued equity. Natural logarithm of market-valued equity. 
Share of ownership by dominant shareholders: Share of controlling firms, which 
owns more than 15 percent share of the firm   
Share of ownership by institutional investors: Shares of ownership by foreigners 
excluding foreign corporations, trust accounts, and special accounts of life insurance 
companies 
Share of minority shareholders: Share of ownership by individuals and firms that 
own less than 50 trading units. 
Debt-to-asset ratio: total debt as a proportion of total assets. 
The proportion of firms that adopted antitakeover provisions in the industry of the 21 
 
firm: Available only for accounting year 2005 and afterwards. 
R&D intensity: expenditures on research and development as a proportion of sales. 
Data source is Financial Statement Data Bank published by Development Bank of 
Japan.       
 
     
 
                                                 
１  The guideline is titled “Guideline of the takeover defense measures for the joint 
interests of firm value and shareholders.” The Guideline stresses three principles of 
takeover defense measures: i) protecting and enhancing corporate value and the 
interests of shareholders as a whole, ii) emphasizing prior disclosure and 
shareholder’s will, and iii) ensuring the necessity and reasonableness, preventing 
defense measures from being too excessive. 
２  Fiscal years begin in April and ends in March of the next year. 
３  Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Sapporo and Fukuoka Excnages and Jasdaq, Tokyo 
Mothers, Osaka Heracules. 
４  For the equality of medians, we conducted a non-parametric 2-sample test. It 
tests the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from populations with the 
same median. The chi-squared test statistic is computed. For the equality of means, 
we conducted a t-test. 
５  As a robustness check, we used the deviations from the industry-median of the 
performance measures to control for the effects of industrial shocks to firm 
performance and found no significant coefficients on the performance measures. 
The results are available from the authors upon request. 
６  The results for Tobin’s Q and PBR are available from the authors upon request. 
７  The results including the intersection term of the Q dummy and the liquid asset 
ratio are available from the authors upon request. 
８  The results using three-year average operating performance measures are 
available from the authors upon request. 22 
 






Sources: Commercial Law Center Inc. and Recof.
Note:  The proportion of firms that had adopted antitakeover provisions among all listed firms are shown in parentheses.
Number of firms23 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics























ROA 47 3698 0.064 0.066 -0.003 ROA 0.045 0.048 -0.003
Tobin's Q 47 3639 1.476 1.490 -0.014 Tobin's Q 1.346 1.256 0.090
PBR 47 3626 1.937 2.243 -0.305 PBR 1.113 1.074 0.039
Liquid asset ratio 47 3558 0.299 0.242 0.057
** Liquid asset ratio 0.264 0.204 0.060
Firm age 47 3714 52.468 45.609 6.860
* Firm age 55.000 49.000 6.000
**
CEO's tenure 47 3714 3.936 6.987 -3.051
** CEO's tenure 2.000 4.000 -2.000
Proportion of outside directors 47 3714 0.094 0.070 0.025 Proportion of outside directors 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share of managerial ownership 47 3626 0.046 0.094 -0.047
** Share of managerial ownership 0.014 0.022 -0.008
Share of cross-holdings 47 3618 0.092 0.074 0.018 Share of cross-holdings 0.092 0.050 0.042
***
Logarithm of market-value equity 47 3601 10.895 9.798 1.097
*** Logarithm of market-value equity 10.702 9.579 1.123
***
Share of dominant shareholders 47 3714 0.044 0.146 -0.103
*** Share of dominant shareholders 0.000 0.000 0.000
***
Share of institutional investors 47 3594 0.241 0.133 0.108
*** Share of institutional investors 0.196 0.080 0.116
***
Share of minority shareholders 46 3655 0.225 0.227 -0.002 Share of minority shareholders 0.201 0.215 -0.015
Debt-to-asset ratio 47 3706 0.498 0.547 -0.049 Debt-to-asset ratio 0.500 0.554 -0.054























ROA 149 3643 0.073 0.070 0.002 ROA 0.064 0.053 0.010
**
Tobin's Q 149 3581 1.468 1.741 -0.273 Tobin's Q 1.759 1.571 0.188
**
PBR 149 3576 2.020 2.675 -0.656 PBR 1.307 1.199 0.108
**
Liquid asset ratio 148 3496 0.265 0.258 0.007 Liquid asset ratio 0.243 0.218 0.025
**
Firm age 149 3636 61.101 46.086 15.015
*** Firm age 59.000 48.000 11.000
***
CEO's tenure 149 3660 5.060 7.035 -1.975
*** CEO's tenure 3.000 4.000 -1.000 *
Proportion of outside directors 149 3660 0.091 0.081 0.010 Proportion of outside directors 0.000 0.000 0.000
***
Share of managerial ownership 149 3555 0.026 0.097 -0.071
*** Share of managerial ownership 0.005 0.024 -0.019
***
Share of cross-holdings 147 3544 0.108 0.063 0.045
*** Share of cross-holdings 0.099 0.039 0.061
***
Logarithm of market-value equity 147 3428 4.587 4.513 0.074 Logarithm of market-value equity 4.517 4.367 0.151
***
Share of dominant shareholders 149 3660 0.030 0.151 -0.120
*** Share of dominant shareholders 0.000 0.000 0.000
***
Share of institutional investors 149 3554 0.276 0.147 0.129
*** Share of institutional investors 0.263 0.097 0.167
***
Share of minority shareholders 149 3593 0.209 0.213 -0.004 Share of minority shareholders 0.182 0.197 -0.015
Debt-to-asset ratio 149 3654 0.477 0.536 -0.059 Debt-to-asset ratio 0.475 0.543 -0.068
**
Proportion of the firms that adopted
antitakeover provisions in the industry
149 3660 0.015 0.012 0.003
*** Proportion of the firms that adopted
antitakeover provisions in the industry
0.011 0.009 0.002
***























ROA 234 3409 0.074 0.070 0.004 ROA 0.060 0.053 0.007
**
Tobin's Q 232 3349 1.479 1.759 -0.280
** Tobin's Q 1.233 1.195 0.038
*
PBR 232 3344 2.098 2.716 -0.618
** PBR 1.581 1.567 0.014
Liquid asset ratio 231 3274 0.260 0.259 0.001 Liquid asset ratio 0.238 0.218 0.020
*
Firm age 234 3426 58.274 46.317 11.957
*** Firm age 58.000 48.000 10.000
***
CEO's tenure 234 3426 7.650 8.062 -0.412 CEO's tenure 5.000 5.000 0.000
Proportion of outside directors 234 3426 0.072 0.082 -0.010 Proportion of outside directors 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share of managerial ownership 230 3328 0.045 0.102 -0.057
*** Share of managerial ownership 0.009 0.025 -0.016
***
Share of cross-holdings 232 3312 0.100 0.060 0.040
*** Share of cross-holdings 0.087 0.036 0.051
***
Logarithm of market-value equity 232 3351 10.905 10.072 0.833
*** Logarithm of market-value equity 10.794 9.833 0.961
***
Share of dominant shareholders 234 3426 0.036 0.158 -0.122
*** Share of dominant shareholders 0.000 0.000 0.000
***
Share of institutional investors 230 3324 0.230 0.141 0.089
*** Share of institutional investors 0.215 0.091 0.124
***
Share of minority shareholders 232 3361 0.209 0.213 -0.004 Share of minority shareholders 0.198 0.197 0.001
Debt-to-asset ratio 234 3420 0.510 0.537 -0.027
** Debt-to-asset ratio 0.515 0.546 -0.031
**
Proportion of the firms that adopted
antitakeover provisions in the industry
234 3426 0.061 0.049 0.012
*** Proportion of the firms that adopted
antitakeover provisions in the industry
0.050 0.048 0.002
***























ROA 129 3355 0.067 0.065 0.002 ROA 0.057 0.050 0.007
Tobin's Q 130 3299 1.178 1.377 -0.199
** Tobin's Q 1.101 1.089 0.012
PBR 130 3289 1.425 2.375 -0.950 PBR 1.240 1.278 -0.037
Liquid asset ratio 131 3208 0.238 0.251 -0.013 Liquid asset ratio 0.214 0.209 0.005
Firm age 131 3374 61.221 45.324 15.897
*** Firm age 61.000 46.000 15.000
***
CEO's tenure 131 3374 7.290 7.981 -0.691 CEO's tenure 4.000 5.000 -1.000
Proportion of outside directors 131 3374 0.060 0.090 -0.031
*** Proportion of outside directors 0.000 0.000 0.000
**
Share of managerial ownership 130 3291 0.051 0.107 -0.056
*** Share of managerial ownership 0.010 0.028 -0.018
***
Share of cross-holdings 128 3282 0.120 0.060 0.060
*** Share of cross-holdings 0.105 0.032 0.073
***
Logarithm of market-value equity 130 3310 10.642 9.763 0.879
*** Logarithm of market-value equity 10.575 9.460 1.115
***
Share of dominant shareholders 131 3373 0.028 0.164 -0.136
*** Share of dominant shareholders 0.000 0.000 0.000
***
Share of institutional investors 130 3283 0.206 0.136 0.069
*** Share of institutional investors 0.177 0.084 0.094
***
Share of minority shareholders 131 3327 0.212 0.211 0.002 Share of minority shareholders 0.180 0.192 -0.012
Debt-to-asset ratio 131 3352 0.530 0.537 -0.007 Debt-to-asset ratio 0.549 0.547 0.002
Proportion of the firms that adopted
antitakeover provisions in the industry
131 3373 0.140 0.105 0.036
*** Proportion of the firms that adopted
antitakeover provisions in the industry
0.138 0.087 0.051
***
Notes: we conduct two sample t tests with equal variances for the mean tests and non-parametric two sample tests for the median tests.  
         *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.24 
 
Table 3 What firms do adopt antitakeover provisions?: Probit model
Explanatory variable Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value
ROA 0.0475 0.0010 0.08
Tobin's Q -0.0184 -0.0004 -0.36
PBR -0.0188 -0.0004 -0.63
Liquid asset ratio 1.1647 0.0243
** 2.47 1.2128 0.0254
** 2.49 1.2613 0.0262
*** 2.57
Firm age -0.0002 0.0000 -0.07 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.14 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.2
CEO's tenure -0.0196 -0.0004
* -1.69 -0.0198 -0.0004
* -1.71 -0.0198 -0.0004
* -1.72
Proportion of outside directors 0.3073 0.0064 0.68 0.3178 0.0066 0.7 0.3375 0.0070 0.74
Share of managerial ownership -1.3526 -0.0282 -1.6 -1.2885 -0.0269 -1.53 -1.2701 -0.0264 -1.5
Share of cross-holdings -0.0817 -0.0017 -0.1 -0.1097 -0.0023 -0.13 -0.1693 -0.0035 -0.19
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.0851 0.0018
* 1.65 0.0887 0.0019
* 1.69 0.0923 0.0019
* 1.76
Share of dominant shareholders -1.3814 -0.0288
*** -2.74 -1.3568 -0.0284
*** -2.7 -1.3536 -0.0281
*** -2.7
Share of institutional investors 0.2958 0.0062 0.54 0.2989 0.0063 0.55 0.2836 0.0059 0.52
Share of minority shareholders 0.2109 0.0044 0.34 0.2361 0.0049 0.38 0.2371 0.0049 0.38





Number of obs 3427 3427 3427
LR chi2 48.63 48.77 49.28
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.0997 0.0999 0.101
Log likelihood -219.67 -219.60 -219.35
Explanatory variable Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value
ROA 0.3260 0.0143 0.49
Tobin's Q -0.0535 -0.0023 -0.88
PBR -0.0165 -0.0007 -0.52
Liquid asset ratio -0.3179 -0.0140 -0.87 -0.2645 -0.0115 -0.71 -0.2926 -0.0128 -0.79
Firm age 0.0037 0.0002
* 1.66 0.0034 0.0001 1.51 0.0036 0.0002 1.58
CEO's tenure -0.0034 -0.0002 -0.52 -0.0038 -0.0002 -0.57 -0.0036 -0.0002 -0.54
Proportion of outside directors 0.2867 0.0126 0.85 0.2922 0.0127 0.87 0.2772 0.0121 0.83
Share of managerial ownership -3.2521 -0.1430
*** -3.84 -3.1475 -0.1373
*** -3.75 -3.1711 -0.1386
*** -3.77
Share of cross-holdings 1.7420 0.0766
*** 2.92 1.7106 0.0746
*** 2.86 1.7187 0.0751
*** 2.87
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.0922 0.0041
* 1.9 0.1167 0.0051
** 2.37 0.1108 0.0048
** 2.16
Share of dominant shareholders -1.9019 -0.0837
*** -4.89 -1.8831 -0.0821
*** -4.83 -1.8857 -0.0824
*** -4.84
Share of institutional investors 1.2196 0.0536
*** 3.56 1.2826 0.0559
*** 3.78 1.2654 0.0553
*** 3.74
Share of minority shareholders 0.3422 0.0151 0.78 0.3420 0.0149 0.78 0.3322 0.0145 0.76
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.8931 -0.0393
*** 1.24 -0.9355 -0.0408
*** 1.35 -0.8871 -0.0388
*** 1.33





Number of obs 3392 3395 3395
LR chi2 210.25 211.14 210.6
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.1746 0.1753 0.1749
Log likelihood -496.94 -496.63 -496.89
Explanatory variable Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value
ROA 0.7243 0.0616 1.4
Tobin's Q 0.0047 0.0004 0.16
PBR 0.0012 0.0001 0.10
Liquid asset ratio -0.0233 -0.0020 -0.08 -0.0102 -0.0009 -0.03 0.0009 0.0001 0.00
Firm age 0.0018 0.0002 0.91 0.0019 0.0002 0.94 0.0018 0.0002 0.92
CEO's tenure 0.0061 0.0005 1.32 0.0062 0.0005 1.35 0.0062 0.0005 1.34
Proportion of outside directors -0.0869 -0.0074 -0.29 -0.1202 -0.0103 -0.40 -0.1171 -0.0100 -0.39
Share of managerial ownership -2.1819 -0.1856
*** -4.4 -2.0423 -0.1744
*** -4.16 -2.0410 -0.1745
*** -4.18
Share of cross-holdings 1.1973 0.1018
** 2.36 1.1973 0.1022
** 2.35 1.1897 0.1017
** 2.34
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.0793 0.0067
** 2.24 0.0826 0.0071
** 2.33 0.0824 0.0070
** 2.34
Share of dominant shareholders -2.3070 -0.1962
*** -7.18 -2.2651 -0.1934
*** -7.06 -2.2649 -0.1937
*** -7.06
Share of institutional investors 0.1884 0.0160 0.53 0.2478 0.0212 0.70 0.2509 0.0215 0.71
Share of minority shareholders -0.3576 -0.0304 -0.93 -0.3877 -0.0331 -1.01 -0.3838 -0.0328 -1.00
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.1689 -0.0144 -0.75 -0.2128 -0.0182 -0.95 -0.2073 -0.0177 -0.91
Proportion of the firms that adopted antitakeover provisions in the industry 2.8940 0.2462
*** 2.63 2.9185 0.2492






Number of obs 3357 3367 3362
LR chi2 236.82 234.61 234.2
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.1426 0.1411 0.1409
Log likelihood -712.24 -714.04 -713.90
Explanatory variable Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value
ROA 0.5124 0.0207 0.94
Tobin's Q -0.1574 -0.0063 -1.34
PBR -0.0850 -0.0031 -1.48
Liquid asset ratio -0.1462 -0.0059 -0.37 -0.0803 -0.0032 -0.20 -0.0553 -0.0020 -0.14
Firm age 0.0048 0.0002
* 1.90 0.0032 0.0001 1.31 0.0031 0.0001 1.24
CEO's tenure 0.0029 0.0001 0.51 0.0013 0.0001 0.23 0.0013 0.0000 0.23
Proportion of outside directors -0.4251 -0.0172 -1.05 -0.4108 -0.0165 -1.01 -0.3834 -0.0140 -0.94
Share of managerial ownership -1.0781 -0.0436
* -1.83 -0.9491 -0.0381 -1.63 -0.9413 -0.0344 -1.61
Share of cross-holdings 1.4403 0.0582
** 2.41 1.2653 0.0508
** 2.12 1.2055 0.0440
** 2.00
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.1030 0.0042
** 2.45 0.1251 0.0050
*** 2.94 0.1274 0.0047
*** 2.95
Share of dominant shareholders -2.5188 -0.1018
*** -5.50 -2.5722 -0.1033
*** -5.63 -2.5710 -0.0938
*** -5.62
Share of institutional investors -0.0863 -0.0035 -0.19 -0.1083 -0.0043 -0.24 -0.1146 -0.0042 -0.25
Share of minority shareholders -0.2527 -0.0102 -0.55 -0.3269 -0.0131 -0.72 -0.3366 -0.0123 -0.73
Debt-to-asset ratio 0.1582 0.0064 0.54 0.0926 0.0037 0.32 0.2287 0.0083 0.76
Proportion of the firms that adopted antitakeover provisions in the industry 3.1535 0.1275
*** 4.02 3.1318 0.1257






Number of obs 3215 3222 3212
LR chi2 182.68 182.05 182.23
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.1718 0.1691 0.1694
Log likelihood -440.31 -447.29 -446.80
Notes: We estimate Probit model in which the dependent variable takes the value of unity if the firm adopted antitakeover provisions and zero otherwise.
             *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
            LR chi2 is the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square test that at least one of the predictors' regression coefficient is not equal to zero in the model. 











Table 4 Endogeneity of the share of outside directors: Probit model with endogenous regressors
Explanatory variable Coef. Z-value
ROA 0.260 0.39
Liquid asset ratio -0.317 -0.87
Firm age 0.003 1.54
CEO's tenure -0.004 -0.56
Proportion of outside directors -0.038 -0.09
Share of managerial ownership -3.288
*** -3.86
Share of cross-holdings 1.753
*** 2.94
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.095
** 1.97
Share of dominant shareholders -1.853
*** -4.76
Share of institutional investors 1.246 3.64




Proportion of the firms that adopted antitakeover provisions in the industry 5.273 1.31
Constant -2.017
*** -5.7
Number of obs 3391
Wald chi2(13)  140.59
Prob > chi2 0
Log likelihood 3436.14
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) = 1.54  Prob > chi2 = 0.2149
Explanatory variable Coef. Z-value
ROA 1.026
* 1.75
Liquid asset ratio -0.040 -0.14
Firm age 0.002 0.91
CEO's tenure 0.007 1.45
Proportion of outside directors 0.037 0.1
Share of managerial ownership -2.156
*** -4.35
Share of cross-holdings 1.007
** 2.01
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.053 1.53
Share of dominant shareholders -2.215
*** -6.93
Share of institutional investors 0.086 0.25
Share of minority shareholders -0.401 -1.07
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.114 -0.51




Number of obs 3499
Wald chi2(13)  147.7
Prob > chi2 0
Log likelihood 3263.39
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) =     0.80 Prob > chi2 = 0.3712
Explanatory variable Coef. Z-value
ROA 0.899 1.21
Liquid asset ratio -0.100 -0.25
Firm age 0.005
** 2.07
CEO's tenure 0.003 0.53
Proportion of outside directors -0.039 -0.07
Share of managerial ownership -0.660 -1.12
Share of cross-holdings 1.158
** 2.01
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.070
* 1.71
Share of dominant shareholders -2.164
*** -4.9
Share of institutional investors -0.242 -0.55
Share of minority shareholders -0.167 -0.37
Debt-to-asset ratio 0.168 0.59




Number of obs 3411
Wald chi2(13)  87.56
Prob > chi2 0
Log likelihood 2744.27
Wald test of exogeneity (/athrho = 0): chi2(1) =     1.78 Prob > chi2 = 0.1827
Notes:  *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
           Wald test of exogeneity shows that the error terms in the structural equation (probit) and 
           the reduced-form equation for the endogenous variable (i.e., the share of outside directors) are not significantly correlated, 






   
Table 5 Firm value protection hypothesis: Probit model
Explanatory variable Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value
R&D intensity( R&D
expenditure as a proportion of
-0.386 -0.009 -0.35 -1.934 -0.101 -1.06
ROA -0.622 -0.014 -0.74 0.523 0.027 0.7
Liquid asset ratio 0.856 0.020 1.57 -0.263 -0.014 -0.69
Firm age 0.000 0.000 -0.1 0.004 0.000
* 1.84
CEO's tenure -0.024 -0.001
* -1.85 -0.002 0.000 -0.32
Proportion of outside directors 0.146 0.003 0.28 0.422 0.022 1.22
Share of managerial ownership -0.919 -0.021 -1.01 -3.155 -0.164
*** -3.64
Share of cross-holdings -0.242 -0.006 -0.27 1.675 0.087
*** 2.77
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.110 0.003
** 2 0.092 0.005
* 1.9
Share of dominant shareholders -1.774 0.000
*** -2.88 -1.884 -0.001
*** -4.79
Share of institutional investors 0.043 0.001 0.07 1.133 0.059
*** 3.2
Share of minority shareholders -0.108 -0.002 -0.16 0.203 0.011 0.45
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.025 -0.001 -0.06 -0.849 -0.044
*** -2.87
Proportion of the firms that
adopted antitakeover





Number of obs 2784 3037
LR chi2 42.21 186.82
Prob > chi2 0.0001 0
Pseudo R2 0.0969 0.162
Log likelihood -196.72 -483.15
Explanatory variable Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value Coef. Marginal Effect Z-value
R&D intensity( R&D
expenditure as a proportion of
-0.062 -0.007 -0.13 -0.110 -0.005 -0.11
ROA 0.784 0.084 1.18 0.777 0.037 1.33
Liquid asset ratio 0.056 0.006 0.18 0.037 0.002 0.09
Firm age 0.001 0.000 0.58 0.004 0.000
* 1.7
CEO's tenure 0.007 0.001 1.37 0.002 0.000 0.32
Proportion of outside directors 0.000 0.000 0 -0.845 -0.040
* -1.85
Share of managerial ownership -2.058 -0.221
*** -3.91 -1.655 -0.079
** -2.35
Share of cross-holdings 1.256 0.135
** 2.39 1.215 0.058
* 1.91
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.068 0.007
* 1.85 0.074 0.004
* 1.67
Share of dominant shareholders -2.236 -0.240
*** -6.65 -2.604 -0.125
*** -5.35
Share of institutional investors 0.226 0.024 0.61 0.018 0.001 0.04
Share of minority shareholders -0.296 -0.032 -0.73 -0.412 -0.020 -0.83
Debt-to-asset ratio -0.177 -0.019 -0.73 0.242 0.012 0.77
Proportion of the firms that
adopted antitakeover
provisions in the industry
2.143 0.230





Number of obs 2727 2607
LR chi2 186.05 162.52
Prob > chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.1224 0.168
Log likelihood -666.79 -402.31
Notes: We estimate Probit model in which the dependent variable takes the value of unity if the firm adopted antitakeover provisions and zero otherwise.
             *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Adopted 2005FY Adopted 2006FY
Adopted 2007FY Adopted 2008FY27 
 
 
Table 6 Panel Estimation
Explanatory variable Coef. Z-value
ROA 1.894 1.32
Liquid asset ratio 0.154 0.18
Firm age 0.017 *** 2.81
CEO's tenure -0.005 -0.32
Proportion of outside directors 1.146 1.35
Share of managerial ownership -13.425 *** -8.25
Share of cross-holdings 6.845 *** 4.83
Logarithm of market-value equity 0.780 *** 7.41
Share of dominant shareholders -13.771 *** -14.14
Share of institutional investors -0.484 -0.5
Share of minority shareholders 0.150 0.15
Debt-to-asset ratio -2.957 *** -4.51
2006FY dummy 4.064 *** 10.97
2007FY dummy 7.007 *** 15.44
2008FY dummy 8.306 *** 16.86
Constant -20.243 *** -14.31
Number of obs 14122
Number of groups 3840
Wald chi2 515.98
Log likelihood -1950.6493
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0 2384.53
Prob >= chibar2 0.00
Notes: We estimate a Random effects probit model.
             The dependent variable is a dummy that takes unity if the firm adopted antitakeover provisions 
              in the year or after and zero otherwise.
             *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Random effects probit model